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The focus in human reliability analysis (HRA) relating to nuclear power plants has traditionally been
on human performance in disturbance conditions. On the other hand, some studies and incidents have
shown that also maintenance errors, which have taken place earlier in plant history, may have an
impact on the severity of a disturbance, e.g. if they disable safety related equipment. Especially
common cause and other dependent failures of safety systems may significantly contribute to the core
damage risk.
The first aim of the study was to identify and give examples of multiple human errors which have
penetrated the various error detection and inspection processes of plant safety barriers. Another
objective was to generate numerical safety indicators to describe and forecast the effectiveness of
maintenance. A more general objective was to identify needs for further development of maintenance
quality and planning
In the first phase of this operational experience feedback analysis, human errors recognisable in
connection with maintenance were looked for by reviewing about 4400 failure and repair reports and
some special reports which cover two nuclear power plant units on the same site during 1992–94. A
special effort was made to study dependent human errors since they are generally the most serious
ones.
An in-depth root cause analysis was made for 14 dependent errors by interviewing plant maintenance
foremen and by thoroughly analysing the errors. A more simple treatment was given to maintenance-
related single errors. The results were shown as a distribution of errors among operating states i.a. as
regards the following matters: in what operational state the errors were committed and detected; in
what operational and working condition the errors were detected, and what component and error type
they were related to. These results were presented separately for single and dependent maintenance-
related errors. As regards dependent errors, observations were also made about weaknesses in audits
made by the operating organisation and in tests relating to plant operation.
The number of plant-specific maintenance records used as input material was high and the findings
were discussed thoroughly with the plant maintenance personnel. The results indicated that instru-
mentation is more prone to human error than the rest of maintenance. Most errors stem from refuel-
ling outage periods and about a half of them were identified during the same outage they were
committed. Plant modifications are a significant source of common cause failures. The number of
dependent errors could be reduced by improved co-ordination and auditing, post-installation checking,
training and start-up testing programmes.
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Inhimillisen luotettavuuden analysointi ydinvoimalaitoksissa on perinteisesti keskittynyt ihmisen suo-
rituskyvyn tutkimiseen häiriötilanteissa. Eräät tutkimukset ja tapahtumat ovat toisaalta osoittaneet,
että häiriöitä edeltävät kunnossapitovirheet voivat vaikuttaa häiriön vakavuuteen esimerkiksi estä-
mällä turvallisuuden kannalta tärkeän laitteiston toiminnan tarvetilanteessa. Erityisesti moninkertai-
set turvallisuusjärjestelmien viat (dependent failures) voivat merkittävästi vaikuttaa reaktorisydämen
vaurioitumisen todennäköisyyteen.
Tutkimuksen ensimmäinen tavoite oli tunnistaa ja tuottaa esimerkkejä moninkertaisista inhimillisistä
virheistä, jotka ovat läpäisseet laitoksen moninaiset turvallisuuden puolustusrakenteisiin kuuluvat
virheiden havaitsemis- ja tarkastusprosessit. Toinen tavoite oli tuottaa turvallisuuteen liittyviä tun-
nuslukuja kuvaamaan ja ennakoimaan kunnossapidon tehokkuutta. Yleisempi tavoite oli tunnistaa
tarpeita kunnossapidon ja sen suunnittelun laadun kehittämistä varten.
Käyttökokemusanalyysin alkuvaiheessa etsittiin kunnossapidon yhteydessä tunnistettavia inhimilli-
siä virheitä käymällä läpi noin 4400 vika- ja korjausraporttia sekä erikoisraportteja kahdelta saman
laitospaikan ydinvoimalaitosyksiköltä vuosina 1992–94. Erityisesti pyrittiin etsimään moninkertaisia
inhimillisiä virheitä, koska ne seuraamuksiltaan ovat yleensä kaikkein vakavimpia.
Syvällinen perussyyanalyysi tehtiin 14 inhimilliselle moninkertaiselle virheelle, jotka käytiin läpi
haastatteluina laitoksella kunnossapitotyönjohtajien kanssa ja analysoitiin seikkaperäisesti. Kunnos-
sapidon yhteydessä havaitut yksittäisvirheet tutkittiin yksinkertaisemman menettelyn avulla. Tulok-
set esitettiin virheiden jakaumina muunmuassa sen suhteen, missä käyttötilassa virheet oli tehty ja
missä havaittu; missä käyttö- ja työtilanteissa virheet oli havaittu sekä, missä laite- ja virhetyypeissä
niitä oli esiintynyt. Tilastot esitettiin erikseen kunnossapidon yhteydessä esiintyneille yksittäis- ja
satunnaisvirheille. Satunnaisvirheiden osalta tehtiin myös oman käyttöorganisaation suorittamien
tarkastusten ja käyttötoiminnan kokeiden heikkouksia koskevia havaintoja.
Lähtöaineistona käytettyjen laitoskohtaisten kunnossapitoraporttien määrä oli suuri ja havainnoista
keskusteltiin yksityiskohtaisesti laitoksen kunnossapitohenkilöstön kanssa. Tulosten mukaan instru-
mentointi on muuta kunnossapitotoimintaa alttiimpaa inhimillisille virheille, joista pääosa on peräisin
vuosihuoltoseisokkijaksoilta, ja joista noin puolet havaittiin saman seisokin aikana kuin ne tehtiin.
Laitosmuutokset aiheuttavat huomattavan paljon yhteisvikoja. Satunnaisvirheiden määrää voidaan
jatkossa vähentää parantamalla muutostyöprojektien koordinointia ja katselmointia, sekä asennustar-
kastuksia, koulutusta ja käyttöönotto-ohjelmia.
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In the research concerning human behaviour and
human error possibilities main attention has been
traditionally focused upon the control room crew
performance in disturbance and accident
conditions. The control room operators have an
essential role in disturbance and accident
management. On the other hand, non-detected
(latent) maintenance errors may have an impact
on the severity of a disturbance by disabling safety
related equipment. The chances of operators to
manage the situation are worsened if there exist
latent equipment failures due to imperfect test
and maintenance activities. Especially common
cause failures affecting several subsystems of a
safety related system may have a significant
contribution to the reactor core damage risk.
Therefore, the dependence of errors between tasks
performed in redundant subsystems of a safety
related system is an issue of extreme importance.
Human maintenance related errors have been
analysed in an earlier study in Finland [Reiman
1994]. This study is a continuation and an expan-
sion of the previous one with more focused objec-
tives, as discussed in the following. In the first
1 INTRODUCTION
phase of this study, maintenance related errors at
the Olkiluoto BWR plant were analysed. In the
second phase, the same analysis will be made for
the Loviisa PWR plant.
The Olkiluoto I and II are identical 710 MWe
designed by ASEA Atom BWR units. A power
upgrading project of the two units is going on. The
active safety functions of the units are divided
into four redundant subsystems. The subsystems
are separated physically from each other and each
subsystem has a separate electrical bus. This
design makes it possible to justify planned main-
tenance actions, making one subsystem unavail-
able for a limited time, during power operation.
Due to this design, dependent failures are how-
ever an important contributor to the risk of the
plant. Apart from the safety systems, this study
focuses also to other systems of the plant units
due to the fact that human error mechanisms may
be the same. Also a more extensive database will
be obtained, and all from the risk point of view
significant systems are not classified as safety
systems.
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The first objective of the study was to identify and
give examples of the origin and appearance of such
human related common cause failure mechanisms,
which can penetrate the barriers of different de-
tection and inspection procedures of the plants
and, to find means to strengthen those barriers
(see Figure 1). Where possible, statistical treat-
ment was aimed at.
The second objective was to generate numerical
safety indicators describing and forecasting the
effectiveness of the maintenance performance. A
more general objective was to identify needs of
remedial measures to further develop the quality
of the maintenance and its planning.
A kernel behind the study is that a component
may be declared operable although it actually is
not capable to fulfil all its functions. This may be
due to many things, e.g., improper testing. It is
useful to study which kinds of human errors can
pass on to operable components and cause latent
2 OBJECTIVES AND USED
MATERIAL
unavailability. The term unavailability is a
probabilistic measure whereas the term operabil-
ity is used in a deterministic sense in e.g. NPP
Technical Specifications. For more information
about the calculation of unavailability, see Appen-
dix 1 and e.g. [ESReDA 1995].
The main database used in the study were the
fault and repair history records of the Olkiluoto
NPP units I and II. The records were obtained
from the computerised maintenance history data
system of the plant. The failure records covered
about 4400 failure and repair cases from the
calendar years 1992…1994.
The database was completed by some other
reports and information sources, such as licensee
event reports, annual outage reports and the
quarterly reports. From this data, 334 human
error candidate cases were screened for follow-up
analyses.
Figure 1. Model of the birth of an error in a maintenance action and its consequences (component degra-
dation) passing several barriers. The unavailability decreases in each barrier due to possibilities to detect
the fault.
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The concept human error is systematically used in
this report, although the authors are
knowledgeable about the complexity of the defini-
tion. In several cases, only the consequences of the
action show whether an action is successful or not
[Rasmussen 1979]. Similarly, contextual and
cause-consequential factors may lead to an
unwanted outcome despite the best efforts of the
actor. Despite these facts the term, if interpreted
as an action leading to an unwanted outcome, is
sufficiently compact to be used in this report.
An important concept in analysing human er-
rors is the dependence of human actions, i.e. how
the success or failure on one task may be related
to the success or failure on some other tasks. Two
tasks A and B are independent, if the probability
of failure (or success) of task B is the same
regardless of the failure of task A. In all other
cases, dependence exists.
The dependence between human actions can
mean in the probabilistic sense that:
• the probability of repeated erroneous actions
diminishes, when a person discovers an error
and learns about it, or
• the probability of repeated erroneous actions
increases, when a person learns a wrong way
to perform actions.
Dependence between errors has been studied in
psychological tests, which have shown that
persons ”learned” to repeat errors that they had
performed [Kay 1951]. If the indications about the
unwanted consequences of an erroneous act are
immediate, it is unlikely that the error will be
repeated. Thus, the most important group of hu-
man actions causing dependencies are those that
do not give immediate feedback of their unwanted
consequences. Some Common Cause Failure -me-
chanisms, e.g. wrong grease and stiffening of valve
stem, may even be undetectable in a test carried
out immediately after servicing or overhaul.
The dependent human failures of concern in
this study are divided into actual common cause
failures (CCF) and common cause non-critical
failures (CCN), as defined in the following. The
non-critical common cause failures are of interest
as potential precursors to actual common cause
failures. They also reveal mechanisms, which can
result in CCFs.
Single human errors, such as omissions or
wrong settings, may only result in single compo-
nent failures. The number of such single failures
is high when compared to the CCFs. Their analy-
sis is easier by using statistical techniques and
the results facilitate the identification of recurrent
error causes affecting specific equipment types. In
special cases, also single human errors may cause
multiple consequences due to, sometimes latent
technical interactions between components and
systems. They may be called human related
shared equipment faults (HSEFs, see App. 1 and
Section 5.3).
In order to enable a better understanding of
the report and results, the most important failure
related terms used are defined in Table I. The
abbreviations HCCF and HCCN are commonly
used in this report to denote the human related
dependencies—both CCFs and CCNs—identified
in the database. A distinction can be made be-
tween a HCCF and CCF in PSAs. The faults are
usually regarded in PSAs as CCFs, if they cause
unavailability in:
• standby components within the time frame of
the surveillance test interval, and
• continuously running components within
twenty-four hours (after an initiating event).
3 BASIC TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
10
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A HCCF may fulfil the conditions of a CCF in PSA
framework. However, longer time frames than 24
hours or test intervals have been considered in
our study. This is due to, e.g., the fact that some
faults may not be detected in the periodic tests or
other planned checks due to their ineffectiveness.
Similarly, non-critical HCCNs have been studied
due to their precursor importance and due to
similar error mechanisms as in HCCFs.
Our analysis of HCCFs, based on the plant-
specific failure and repair reporting, is especially
Table I. Definition of some central terms.
Human error. A human unintended or intended action that produces an unintended result. For
example, an omission of the on-line return of equipment after the maintenance work causes a failure
of the physical item to perform its function. In some sources, human errors are further divided, e.g.,
into slips, lapses, mistakes, violations, omissions and commissions [see .e.g. Swain & Guttman 1983,
Reason 1990].
Failure is the termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function. Failure is an event,
as distinguished from fault which is a failed state.
Common cause failure. Common cause failures (CCF) are failure causes or mechanisms, that may
apparently result or have resulted in multiple functionally critical failures in redundant components
in real demand situations (they are unable to fulfil correctly their required function).
Common cause non-critical failure. Common cause non-critical failures (CCNs) are causes or
mechanisms which result in a lack of, or deficiency in, a characteristic in functionally non- critical
requirements of redundant components. If getting worse, these precursors can develop into
common cause failures. The CCNs shall thus be regarded as an early warning of causes or
mechanisms otherwise leading to CCFs.
focused on human related maintenance dependen-
cies between redundant subsystems. In PSA stud-
ies, a part of these CCFs are referred to as
residual common cause failures, if they account
there for the dependencies which are not explicitly
included in the analytical fault tree and event tree
models [NKA/RAS-470, 1990]. Explicit modelling
of such CCFs has been increasingly introduced in
the latest PSAs, but more analysis of operating
experience is apparently needed to achieve a suffi-
cient coverage of these models and data in PSAs.
S T U K - Y T O - T R 1 3 9
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The failure records covered about 4400 cases from
the years 1992–94. Reading through such a high
quantity of records, however comparable with the
number of similar reports from other Nordic NPP
units [compare with TUD 94-11], was a very
resource demanding task.
The reports had been readily classified by the
utility maintenance foremen and included also a
free text description. The procedure shown in
Figure 2 was used in the analysis of the failure
records. In addition, Figure 2 shows the number of
records and failure cases studied at each phase of
the analysis.
The screening principle was that a case was
included in the final number of errors—single or
multiple—if it had been found after returning the
work permit into the control room, in the func-
tional testing or later (see Figure 1). This is due to
that returning the work permit means the end of a
maintenance task and, e.g., the functional testing
is normally carried out by the operating organisa-
tion. Another reason for this, more extensive,
distinction is that more data became studied thor-
oughly, although at the stage of the first func-
tional test a component cannot often be regarded
as operable.
4.1 Screening of the fault data
The first analysis phase actually contained the
search of potential information sources, a
preliminary screening based on the utility records
and the first classification of errors.
The failure history database was chosen due to
the fact that it had proved to be feasible in an
earlier study [Reiman 1994]. At the outset of this
study, the scope was expanded in order to com-
plete the data with the root cause reports avail-
able. A similar decision was made by the analysts
to study all the app. 4400 failure records instead
of only concentrating upon the pre-classified hu-
man errors (classes B and DC, see Table II). This
analysis procedure produced considerably more
human error candidates, app. 500 altogether, than
concentrating upon fault record classes B and DC
solely (see Table VI).
4 USED METHOD
Table II. Cause coding of failures at  the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant [TUD 1994].
A FAILURE IN INSTALLATION OR EARLIER C CONSEQUENCE OF OPERATION
A Design A Exceeding a limit value
B Material B Unplanned stress
C Manufacturing C Blockage, sediment
D Installation, erection work D Foreign objects
E Normal usage of lifetime/normal phenomena
B OPERATING AND/OR MAINTENANCE
PERSONNEL D MISCELLANEOUS CAUSES
A Operator error A Cascade failure
B Deficient setting, control (mech.) B External cause
C Deficient setting, control (electr.) C Deficient procedure or order
D Error of own personnel in work D Unclear cause
E Lack of maintenance
F Work of external personnel Z OTHERS (description)
12
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The first screening phase was performed by
two analysts in a sequential order. Thus, inde-
pendent views on the failure cases were obtained.
At the end, the results were summarised and the
preliminary classification of the candidates across
the cause classes was obtained. The cause coding
of the equipment failures used at the plant is
shown in Table II.
4.2 Review of the data with
maintenance personnel
After the candidates of human errors were
extracted from the data base, the next phase was
to determine which proportion of these app. 500
records were real human errors. There are at least
two sources of biases that made this task difficult.
From one point of view, the text descriptions in
the maintenance history are short ones and, in
some cases, even contradicting to the cause
classification. This may be due to the experienced
difficulty to follow the fault classification scheme.
Another problem is that people may be reluc-
tant to report human errors, which may lead to
absence of a number of actual cases. But on the
contrary, a number of records originally classified
at the plant as caused by “Operating and /or
maintenance personnel” could be screened out
from the human error types. To avoid an underes-
timation, in total about 500 candidate records
were chosen comprehensively in order not to ne-
glect potential human errors from the next analy-
sis steps.
The knowledge of the plant maintenance fore-
men was used to facilitate determining the real
human errors amongst the candidates in the form
of interviews. During these interviews, all the
questionable human error candidates were dis-
cussed, and those actually being other than hu-
man related failures were screened out. This
analysis effort resulted in 334 human error candi-
date cases, of which amount 5 cases originated
from other sources than the fault history data
(See Figure 2).
Further investigation revealed that, from these
334 cases, 126 fault history records could be
further combined into 37 different dependence
cases (HCCFs, HCCNs, HSEFs, etc). This reduc-
tion was due to the fact that multiple fault records
in the database often referred to a similar and
simultaneous cause mechanism. Furthermore, 2
fault records were found in the interviews to be
Figure 2. The flow of the screening of single and dependent human errors from fault history records and
utility reports.
Number of cases 
Utility root 
cause reports
Utility fault history 
records
16 ~4400
Search and screening of human errors based on the 
failure reporting and  additional utility reports
~500
Verification of the search results with the maintenance 
foremen
~166 Other than 
human erors 
screened out
334 cases 2 ageing caused records
Human error classification into single failures, 
candidate common cause failures etc. 
Statistics of 206 
single errors
126  HCCF or HCCN candidate fault records,             37 candidate dependency cases 14 cases
Refined root cause analysis                      
(incl. interviews with maintenance foremen)
HCCFs and 
HCCNs
23 cases
Others, e.g. 
human  shared 
equipment  
faults, ageing 
caused CCFs.
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caused by ageing rather than human errors, as
shown in Figure 2. Thus, the number of single
human errors found in the fault history was 206.
The single human errors are discussed more in
Section 5.1 and the dependent human errors in
the Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
The human errors, their detection and reme-
dial measures of the dependence cases were in the
root cause analysis phase checked through with
maintenance foremen. Most of the dependence
cases were also checked through with STUK in-
spectors.
4.3 Re-analysis and classification
of the data
After the preliminary verification of the human
errors with the plant staff, other classifications
than the original made by the utility personnel
became possible. Questions, to build up statistics
according to these classifications, were already
included in the interviews of the plant personnel.
Mainly, the idea was to verify the time and nature
of both the error origin and the detection.
In that purpose, the 334 candidate cases were
classified according to the following explaining
factors: direct cause of the error, type of equip-
ment affected, plant state at the error origin, type
of error detection and operational state at detec-
tion of the error.
The breakdown of these classes is given in
Table III. Multiple correspondence across these
classes was also studied. Also underlying causes
of human errors were studied, but this analysis
was not very accurate and its results are only
briefly discussed in Section 5.2. Some of these
classes were also used in the analysis of depend-
ent human errors, but their analysis allowed more
Table III. The classifications used in the statistical review of the data.
Direct causes of human errors
Omission (incl. Restoration errors) OM
Commission (wrong position, wrong direction) COM/WD
Wrong settings SET SET
Other commission error (e.g. too much/little force incl. carelessnes) COM/OTH
Not classified N-CLASS
Types of equipment affected by human errors
Process valves, ventilation dampers or channel hatches VAL
Block or primary valves in instrument lines IVAL
Mechanical equipment (other than valves) MEC
Instrumentation & control equipment and software IC
Electrical equipment EL
Time period of error origin
Refuelling outage period SHUT
Power operation period OPER
Not clear (Design etc.) NCLEAR
Types of operational situations at fault detection
A. Type of detection
Independent check or test (preventive) PREV
Otherwise OTH
B. Operating states
Refuelling outage prior to start-up OUT
(During) Plant start-up STUP
Power operation POW
(During) Plant shut-down SNDN
Disturbance DIST
14
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accurate classifications.
By using these explaining factors, the general
model presented in Figure 1 was used as a basic
model of this study. The human error type classifi-
cation is based on the NUREG/CR-1278 Handbook
[Swain & Guttmann 1983], that makes the dis-
tinction between omission and commission errors.
Here a breakdown of commission errors into
mispositioning including wrong direction and or-
der errors, e.g. leading to wrong wiring, reverse
installation of items or reverse rotation, and into
other commissions is used. The latter ones include
a great variety of wrong actions stemming often
from carelessness, use of excessive force or too
feeble use of force. Timing errors have been,
generally, classified under omissions in our study.
As a specific error type we have chosen the wrong
settings, often found in the instrumentation &
control, due to its importance from safety point of
view and its expected frequency in the HCCFs
[Reiman 1994]. The consequences of the human
errors on the components define the affected
equipment category, e.g. electrical equipment, in
the classification.
The results of the follow-up analyses of both
single and candidate dependent errors were in
each case presented in the form of a table allowing
statistical studies. In Table IV, an example of a
single follow-up analysis is given (classifications
from Table III).
4.4 Analysis of the dependent
human errors
The analysis of the 37 candidate dependent
human error cases (HCCFs and HCCNs in redun-
dant subsystems), consisting of 126 fault records,
was much more detailed than that of the single
failures. An analysis of the originating tasks,
mechanisms, possible ineffectiveness of the defen-
sive barriers and remedial measures, was per-
formed for them.
The principle followed in the division of of the
errors into single ones, HCCFs, HCCNs, HSEFs
and other dependent failures (ODFs) is presented
in Table V.
A component is here understood as a functional
item at a level where an identification number
such as 327P002 or 531K951, and a component
category such as a pump or a sensor, can be
identified [TUD 1994]. In order to simplify the
analysis, several similar errors caused inside a
defined component boundary have been defined as
other dependent failures (ODF), although in some
cases giving parallel unavailability of redundant
items within the component exists.
In a few cases, after having extracted depend-
ent errors from the database, patterns were recog-
nised in the data that obviously were due to
recurrent problems, error prone circumstances,
etc. situational factors. This kind of mechanisms
are always present in the data and it is extremely
difficult to determine their exact mechanisms and
the degree of dependence. After having identified
the potential residual dependence mechanisms to
be insignificant an assumption of the independ-
ence could be made for these single errors.
Statistics were made both for single and for
dependent errors. The flow chart of the analysis of
dependent human errors is shown in Figure 3 and
the results are discussed in Section 5.2. An exam-
ple of a root cause analysis of a human related
common cause failure analysis (HCCF) is shown
in Appendix 2.
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Table IV. The follow-up analysis of a human error in relation to maintenance.
Table V. Principles followed in the classification of human error data.
Component place 2.327P002
Failure record number 34281
Date O7.O5.1992
Explanation Card 6.D18.326) faulted mechanically  in a modification task
(327P002/SS13)
Plant state at the time of error SHUT
Equipment code IC
Cause, reported BF
Cause, direct COM
Dependence HCCF
Plant state at the time of
detection OUT
Additional information HCCF root cause analysis 2hccf327.doc.
Causing
mechanism
Unavailability in
one single
component
Unavailability   in
several
components (or
systems)
Parallel  **
unavailability in
redundant
components
Sequential **
unavailability  in
redundant
components
Similar repeated
erroneous actions
Single
errors*/ODF(3
Single errors* HCCF / HCCN/ODF(4 ODF(5
One error Single errors HSEF(6 HSEF HSEF
Several (different)
errors
Single errors* Single errors* ODF(7 Single errors*
* Wrong direction errors—single errors. Human actions are seen as completely dependent, but do not cause unavailability in
redundant components.
** Parallel and sequential refer to time—components may become unavailable in parallel or errors may be repeated after
redundant components have been made operable.
(3  Other dependent failures (ODF), if  several similar errors, but caused inside a defined component boundar
(4 Other dependent failure, if parallel dependence was detected while working (prior to returning work permit into the control
room).
(5 Listed as other dependent failure, if  not causing parallel unavailability.
(6 Components not redundant.
(7 Consequential effects due to functional dependence.
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5.1 Single human errors
Cause coding at the plant and the share of
human error records. As can be calculated from
the Table VI, a portion of about 7,4 % of all the
failure records could finally be identified as hu-
man error related. Human errors can be found in
all cause coding categories classified at the plant.
Under the category B (operating and/or main-
tenance personnel), about 47% of the records were
really human errors in relation to maintenance.
But also about 16 % human errors were identified
under the category A (failure in installation or
earlier). The broad distribution of the human
errors between the categories supports the conclu-
sion that it is rather difficult to use the coding of
human errors used at the plant. Another interest-
ing feature in these results is that human errors
were seldom found under the category D (miscel-
laneous), only about 12 % of D totally. This is
controversial to the findings from some earlier
studies and the topic is discussed more in the
Chapter 6. The category D includes however more
than one third of all human error records, but also
the total number of the records in the category is
large. It should be observed that no case in the
fault history records was classified under the
category Z (others) requiring a specific text de-
scription.
The Table VI also shows the share of the single
human error records of all the human error re-
cords. As seen from the table, there were no
dramatic differences in distribution between the
two plant units. However, the Chi-square test
5 RESULTS
In the following, the results of the study are discussed with regard to totally 206
single and 14 HCCF/HCCN multiple error cases. In addition, the 12 HSEF
cases are briefly discussed. These groups are discussed separately due to their
very different nature. The authors recognise that human errors are a
controversial topic and thus other classifications are possible, too.
Table VI. The number of the single human maintenance errors distributed  according to the cause coding
given by the plant maintenance personnel.
Reported cause
code
Number of
failure records
(unit I + II)
Number of all
human error
records
Percentage of
human error
records of all
[% ]
Number of
single human
error records
Percentage of
single errors
of all error
records [% ]
A Failure in
installation or
earlier
279 +221 = 500 40 + 41 = 81 16,2 29 + 21 = 50 61,7
B Operating
and/or
maintenance
personnel
113 +101 = 214 55 + 45 = 100 46,7 44 + 27 = 71 71,0
C Consequence
of operation
1250 + 1491
= 2741
 15 + 17 =  32 1,7  10 + 3 =  15 40,6
D Miscellaneous
causes
505 + 447 = 952 43 + 70 = 113 11,9 23 + 47 = 70 61,9
Total 4407 326* 7,4 204** 63,2
* the amount excludes 2 cases later found to be ageing related and 6 cases coming from other utility reports
** the amount excludes 2 reports not coming from the maintenance records, together 206 single human error cases.
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suggests that the records come from two different
distributions (p(29.2,3)~1E–6). The result could be
forecasted due to the fact that different persons
classify the data at different units and classifying
data is difficult. It is interesting to compare the
result to that of human error records
(p(6.38,3)~0.09). Thus, it is not excluded that their
distributions come from the same source. One
possible explanation is that it is easier to classify
human errors than the rest of the fault data.
Further discussion of the differences between the
plant units is left outside the scope of this report.
The distribution of single human errors be-
tween the finer fault cause code classes in 1992–
1993, given by the plant personnel, is presented in
Figure 4. A detailed classification for the year
1994 was not possible because the utility decided
to give up the detailed cause coding following the
principles in Swedish NPPs (See Chapter 6 and
TUD 1994).
The Figure 4 shows that 25 single human error
cases were identified under the class (installation/
erection work, code AD, 17 % of the total). Other
frequently used classes were: own personnel (BD,
21 cases or 15 % of the total), external personnel
(BF, 21 cases or 15 % of the total) and unclear
cause (DD, 19 cases or 13 % of the total). These
groups correspond to about 60 % of the total
number of the fine cause classified cases (144)
through 1992–1993.
Errors stemming from installation are salient
in the Figure 4. An interesting observation is also
that the class DC (deficient procedure or order)
does not appear in the most frequent cause
codings but the class BF (external personnel)
does. It is important to note the fact that different
categories are not mutually exclusive, and e.g. the
code AD includes both foreign and own labour.
Therefore, too firm conclusions should not be
drawn based on the Figure 4.
Equipment affected by single human er-
rors. The utility classification in the fault records
did identify the component category faulted. Thus
it was rather easy to conclude the equipment
category affected by the human errors based on
this coding and the free text description.
As seen from Figure 5, instrumentation &
control (84 cases) plus electrical equipment (40
cases) dominated as objects of single human er-
rors with the share of about 60 %. An interesting
observation can be made with regard to the proc-
ess valves, dampers and hatches. Their mainte-
nance errors and wrong alignments are modelled
often in PSAs but, here, their share is rather low
(17 %). This supports the idea that more safety
emphasis should be put to complex systems in-
cluding instrumentation, control, protection and
electric power supply and drives.
D is tr ib u tio n  o f m o s t fre q u e n t fin e  c a u s e  c o d e s  th ro u g h
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2 1 2 1
1 9
1 2 1 1
7 6 6
1 6
1 7 .4  %
3 1 .9  %
4 6 .5  %
6 8 .1  %
7 5 .7  %8 0 .6  %
8 4 .7  %
5 9 .7  %
8 8 .9  %
0
5
1 0
1 5
2 0
2 5
A D B F B D D D D A D B B B C B B C
O T H E RC la s s
N u m b e r
0 .0  %
1 0 .0  %
2 0 .0  %
3 0 .0  %
4 0 .0  %
5 0 .0  %
6 0 .0  %
7 0 .0  %
8 0 .0  %
9 0 .0  %
1 0 0 .0  %
AD=Installation , BF=external personnel, BD=own personnel error, DD=unclear cause,
DA=cascade failure and DB=external cause. Together 144 cases were fine classified, together 151 cases.
Figure 4. Fault cause classification used by the plant personnel through 1992–1993 in the single human
error cases.
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Direct causes of single human errors. The
following Figure 6 presents the distribution of the
direct causes of errors among different human
cause categories. As seen, errors classified as
commission errors dominate. Other commission
errors COM/OTH dominate with 54 % of the total.
This dominating cause category consists of several
types of wrong actions such as: carelessness, or
using too much force causing broken pieces in the
nearby equipment or in the equipment main-
tained, use of too little force causing loose connec-
tions or untight bolts etc. Some of them could have
been classified also under the category wrong
direction (COM/WD) or omission (OM) errors,
since both classes apply. Wrong direction, order or
position errors (COM/WD) have here been identi-
fied with 13 % of total.
The finding related to COM/OTH type errors is
understandable against the background that sin-
gle human errors as causes of single component
Figure 5. Equipment types involved in single human errors 1992–1994, together 206 cases.
Instrumentation & control equipment and software (IC), Electrical equipment (EL), Process valves, ventilation dampers or
channel hatches (VAL), Mechanical equipment (other than valves, MEC), Block or primary valves in instrument lines
(IVAL).
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Figure 6. The direct causes of single human errors through 1992–1994.
Carelessness etc (COM/OTH), Omissions (OM), Wrong settings (SET), Wrong direction errors (COM/WD).
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failures are likely to include many unintentional
acts—such as lapses of memory, using too much
force or simply crushing an object. However, due
to the fact that HRA studies often concentrate
upon omissions (OM) and, possibly, wrong set-
tings, the finding has a certain value. The inclu-
sion of COM/OTH types of erroneous actions may,
still, be difficult due to their large spectrum of
phenotypes and, mostly, small safety significance.
In PSA purposes, the important issue is, whether
the error consequence is critical or not. For the
background of omission and commission error
classification used, see [Swain&Guttmann 1983].
As discussed earlier, determining all the un-
derlying causes of the single errors was not possi-
ble. However, it seems that in many cases a better
design or layout of the equipment from
maintainability point of view, or a better work
planning, could have prevented the occurrence of
the errors.
Direct error types against equipment cat-
egories. It is interesting to study the distribution
of different error mechanisms against the equip-
ment types affected. Based on results in the Table
VII and Figure 7, the share of commission errors
in I&C is exceptionally high. In contrast to that, a
rather large share of the omissions take place in
actions on instrument line block valves (67 % of all
IVAL error modes). With regard to the instrument
valves, the result could be expected. The amount
of wrong settings in I&C and electrical equipment
was only approximately 12–13 % of the total,
which can be regarded as rather expected.
Here, it is noted the rather high share of
qualitative commission errors (COM/OTH) in me-
chanical equipment (MEC) and valves. In addi-
tion, some wrong direction (COM/WD) errors were
identified in the group valves (VAL). This was
caused by e.g. wrong installation or assembly of
components.
Table VII. The distribution of human single error causes among the equipment categories.
I&C MEC EL VAL IVAL TOTAL
COM/OTH 49 26 14 19 4 112
OM 13 7 14 7 8 49
SET 11 0 5 2 0 18
COM/WD 11 3 7 6 0 27
TOTAL 84 36 40 34 12 206
Instrumentation & control and software (IC), Mechanical equipment (other than valves, MEC), Electrical equipment (EL), Process
valves, ventilation dampers or channel hatches (VAL), Block or primary valves in instrument lines (IVAL).
Figure 7. The distribution of single human error causes among the equipment categories through 1992–
1994.
Carelessness,other commission errors (COM/OTH), Omissions (OM), Wrong settings (SET),
Wrong direction errors(COM/WD)
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Operational situations at error origin and
fault detection. In the following Figure 8, the
distribution of single human errors with regard to
the assessed plant operating period at their error
origin is shown. This question is not an easy one
since for the latent single human errors it was
very difficult to judge the exact occurrence time.
The start-up and shut-down phases are not parti-
tioned in this judgement, because very little main-
tenance in the plant units takes place during
these states of the unit annual operating cycles.
Since most preventive maintenance and modi-
fication activities take place during the annual
refuelling outage, it is not astonishing that most
(app. 62 %) fault records also seem to stem from
that period. The conclusion would be hesitating
that these human errors are without safety signifi-
cance knowing the recent Shutdown PSA results
[e.g. IPSN 1990, Pyy & Himanen 1993] showing
high risk levels during an outage. The more ap-
propriate question is, whether these errors were
found before a component was declared operable
or, at least, before the plant start-up after the
outage. We discuss the latter item more in the
following.
The following Figure 9 shows the distribution
of the plant operational situations at the time of
fault discovery. The judgement of the discovery
situation is based on comparison with the histori-
cal time instants from the realised time schedules
which are presented in the plant annual outage
reports. When compared to the earlier Figure 8,
the situation is somewhat reversed. Only about 32
% of all single human errors are detected during
an outage, whereas app. 60 % during the power
operation and 7 % during the plant start-up.
Our reclassification of the type of discovery
(preventive/others) originates from the detailed
classifications in the plant fault records on the
ways of fault detection. Preventive actions such as
periodic or functional tests or preventive mainte-
nance actions seem to reveal only approximately
20 % of the single human errors. This low ratio
may be explained by the fact that many of these
human errors are not directly critical from the
safety point of view. The errors are mostly noticed
by alarms or through displays in the control room
or during plant walk-arounds in various purposes
or while working nearby.
It is interesting to compare the detection of the
errors that are committed during an outage to
those committed during the power operation. The
situation becomes clear in Figure 10, where we
compare the detection timepoint of those two
groups together.
Approximately 51 % of errors induced are also
discovered during the outage—indeed, most of
them during the same one. However, the residual
app. 49 % of the errors remain latent until the
plant start-up or even app. 39 % until the power
operation. The errors passing into power opera-
tion show rather similar distribution into equip-
ment categories as all single human errors. Pre-
ventive actions are not very effective, only app.
24% of the errors were detected by them. These
results may partly be explained by the fact that a
large share of these errors are rather negligible
from the safety and economy point of view. How-
ever, these faults exist in safety systems, too.
The conclusion drawn with regard to the single
errors introduced during an outage yields also to
errors during the power operation—about 94 % of
them are also discovered during the power opera-
tion, but very few in preventive activities. Again,
this result can be easily explained by the sam-
ple—many single human errors are noticed by
alarms, through displays or by chance during
routine plant tasks.
The results of the birth of the single human
errors and their detection showed that a major
part of them follows the formula: birth in outage –
detection in outage or remaining latent into the
power operation. This result will be compared
with the results of the dependent human error
analysis in the Section 5.2.
It is interesting to study the time periods from
which the single errors done by plant own person-
nel or foreign contractor personnel originate
(cause classes BD and BF, see also Figure 4). It
appears that more than 75 % from the errors
caused by the foreign labour (class BF) originate
from outages. With regard to the single errors
classified in the class BD (own personnel), more
than 63 % stem from the power operating period,
and approximately 18 % were dealing with instru-
ment line block valves.
These figures are significantly more than the
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Figure 8. Plant operating period at the time of error origin, years 1992–1994.
Operating mode at the error origin
OPERATION
38 % 
NCLEAR
0 % 
OUTAGE
62 % 
78 cases
1 case
127 cases
Figure 9. Plant operating state at the time of error discovery, years 1992–1994.
Type of detection: testing or preventive maintenance (PREV), otherwise (OTH).
Operating states: refuelling outage prior to start-up (OUT), plant start-up (STUP), power operation (POW), plant shut-
down (SHDN), disturbance (DIST). The types of error detection are not partitioned in the start-up, shut-down or
disturbance states due to the limited share of these states. Totally 206 cases.
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Figure 10. Plant operating state at the time of detection of 127 single human errors stemming from
outages (left) and 78 errors stemming from the operating period (right).
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average for the total 206 single error cases. Other-
wise, the distribution of explanatory variables
followed roughly that of the total. The results are
understandable against the background that the
contractors are extensively used during the an-
nual refuelling outage. Moreover, the plant own
personnel carries out tests and, to a limited ex-
tent, maintenance during the power operation.
The small sample size and the overlapping cause
categories do not allow any further conclusions.
One further interesting observation was,
against the prior belief, that the foreign labour
does not cause problems only in non-safety equip-
ment. About 70 % of the BF classified errors were
found in safety related systems or in systems that
could be used to back-up the safety functions.
However, the affected equipment was not critical
in all cases and the errors were detected during
the outage in more than half of the cases.
Trends of causes of human errors. One of
the aims of the study was to observe the annual
trends of the error cause types. The annual num-
bers are shown in Figure 11.
As seen from the Figure 11, the number of
omissions (OM), wrong direction/sequence errors
(COM/WD) and wrong settings (SET) remained
quite stable through 1992–1994. The annual dis-
tributions obtained for OM and COM/WD types of
errors are somewhat higher than what was pre-
sented in [Reiman 1994]. Reiman discovered in
average approximately 10 omissions and 4 wrong
direction commissions per year through 1981–
1991, whereas the findings of our study are 16 and
9 single errors, correspondingly. This difference is
mostly due to the more extensive scope of this
study, since the search for human errors covered
all the maintenance records and not only those
preclassified as human errors at the plant. In the
search for human maintenance errors, thus, all
fault cause categories should be investigated in
order to avoid underestimation.
Although not presented in Figure 11, some-
what less other qualitative commission errors
(COM/OTH) were detected in 1994 than for the
calendar years 1992–1993. The comprehensive
reason for this is hard to tell, although the utility
simplified the fault cause classification in the
same time. The rougher cause classification in the
fault records since 1994 may have made the
searching of the human errors more difficult. Due
to the short observation period, no firm conclu-
sions about the trend can be drawn.
5.2 Dependent human errors
The analysis of dependent human errors revealed
three types of dependencies affecting redundant
subsystems. They are human related common
cause failures (HCCFs), human related common
cause non-critical failures (HCCNs) and human
(error induced) shared equipment faults (HSEFs).
The two first types can be regarded as real
multiple human failures, whereas HSEFs are
single human errors leading to multiple
Figure 11. Annual distribution of selected single human error types through 1992–1994.
Annual averages: Wrong settings (SET) = 6, Wrong direction errors (COM/WD) = 9, Omissions (OM) = 16,3.
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consequences due to the system design.
The number of HCCFs and HCCNs discovered
is compared to the total number of fault records
and single human errors in Table VIII. HSEFs are
discussed briefly in Section 5.3 (Shared equip-
ment faults and other dependencies).
Apart from these, some recurrent errors and
errors taking place in different systems or non-
redundant components, were found in the course
of the HCCF identification. According to the prin-
ciples presented in the Table V, they were classi-
fied as single failures. A thorough investigation of
all these other dependence mechanisms would
have required still considerably more resources,
which was evaluated not to be justified in this
study when compared to their safety significance.
Dependent human error related records.
As seen from Table VIII, dependent human error
cases can be found in all cause categories (A,B,C,
and D) used by the utility maintenance foremen.
The results suggest that an approximate number
of fault records covering human related dependen-
cies (HCCFs and HCCNs) is about 1 %. However
there are in average more than 3 fault records per
revealed dependence case.
In this number the single human errors, intro-
ducing multiple consequences due to e.g. system
interdependencies or shared equipment faults
(HSEFs), are not calculated.
In the following Table IX, the identified and
analysed HCCFs and HCCNs are listed together
with a short title description, the affected equip-
ment type and the individual plant unit.
Dependent human error cases. The division
of the human related dependent errors (HCCFs
and HCCNs) into the different plant units was
rather difficult. This difficulty was caused by e.g.
the differences in the coverage of the reporting of
the corresponding errors influencing the both
units.
At least in 3 cases similar dependence mecha-
nisms on redundant components appeared at the
both units. Four HCCFs and one HCCN were
identified to affect only the unit I. Two HCCF
cases plus four HCCN cases were identified in the
unit II, solely. The both HCCF cases affecting the
unit II solely also led to single failures in the unit
I.
Equipment types affected by the dependent
human errors. In the following Figure 12, the
equipment types affected by the dependent hu-
man errors are presented. As seen, the dominance
of the instrumentation accompanied by the elec-
trical equipment, already seen in Section 5.1, also
applies to the dependent human errors. No other
equipment types than these two are present in the
Table VIII. Identified dependent human error related records and their distribution among dependence
cases and reported cause categories.
Reported cause
category
Fault
records
Records
referring to
human
errors, total
Records
referring to
single
human
errors
Records
referring to
HCCFs/
HCCNs
Dependent
human error
cases
HCCFs/
HCCNs
Number of
records/
dependence
case
A Failure in
installation or
earlier
500 81 50 12 4 3
B Operating
and/or
maintenance
personnel
214 100 71 13 6 2,2
C Consequence
of operation
2741  32 15 8 1 8
D
Miscellaneous
causes
952 113 70 10 2 5
Total  4407 326* 204** 43** 13*** 3,3
* The amount excludes 2 cases later found to be ageing related and 6 cases originating from other utility reports.
** The amount excludes 2 reports not coming from the maintenance records, together 206 single human error cases.
*** Excludes 1 case not identified in the fault history records—no cross-classification inside the dependence case was found.
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Table IX. List of analysed HCCFs and HCCNs through years 1992–1994.
Nr. TITLE OF THE CASE UNIT
Human related Common Cause Failures (HCCF)
1. The trip limits lowered  on  wrong neutron flux trip conditions.  (IC) Olkiluoto I
2. Neutron flux trip limits left too low after valve self-closure test. (IC) Olkiluoto I
3. Power cables cut to the  supply pumps of the  diesel fuel tanks. (EL) Olkiluoto I
4. Difference pressure measurements crosswise connected in mussel filters. (IC) Olkiluoto I + II
5. Couplings broken between actuators and control valves. (IC ) Olkiluoto I
6. The actuation times too long due to mineral  oil impurities in  the anchors of the
solenoid valves. (EL)
Olkiluoto I + II
7. Simultaneous work in two subsystems of the auxiliary feedwater system during
the refuelling outage of unit 2. No experience feedback to the refuelling outage
of unit 1. (IC)
Olkiluoto II
(+TVOI)
8. Turning pieces  of flow measurement devices mixed after cleaning. (IC) Olkiluoto II
(+Olkiluoto I)
Human related Common Cause Non - critical  failures (HCCN)
1. The temperature measurement values of the bearing pads of the turbine set too
low. (IC)
Olkiluoto I
2. The protective coverings broken in the power supply cables of  solenoid valves.
(EL)
Olkiluoto II
3. Air left in instrument lines of the pressure difference measurements 323K201-
K204 of the suction strainers. In addition unnecessary alarms. (IC)
Olkiluoto II
4. Wrong settings of the piston position indications of  the operating oil  pressure
accumulators 416A502 and A504 due to start-up problems. (IC)
Olkiluoto II
5. The signal lights of the operating oil pressure accumulators 416A501.20 -
A504.20 do not indicate due to wrong settings. (IC)
Olkiluoto II
6. The air pressure correction was lacking in the calibration method of the
temperature monitoring limit switches. (IC)
Olkiluoto II+I
Type of equipment given in Italic. Single error in the other plant unit given in parenthesis.
Figure 12. Distribution of the HCCF and HCCN cases among the equipment types. All of them belonged
to either instrumentation or electrical equipment.
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identified HCCFs and HCCNs. The results under-
line the need to put more emphasis on these
equipment types and systems in future safety
studies.
When considering remedial actions, it has to be
taken into account that, due to complex organisa-
tional interactions, that also personnel from other
trades than those pointed out have contributed to
the origin and appearance of these dependent
errors.
Direct causes of dependent human errors.
As regards to the error cause categories, some
differences exist when compared to the single
human errors (Section 5.1, Figure 6).
The dominant error category is, again, commis-
sion. Consequently, the category of commission
errors (COM/OTH), exhibiting qualitative and co-
ordination problems, appears as the most fre-
quent direct cause (6 cases, 42 %, of which 5
HCCFs). Also dependent wrong direction and or-
der errors (COM/WD) appear in two HCCF cases.
In addition dependent wrong settings (4 cases, 29
%) is a usual category, but all those cases appear
to be non-critical HCCNs.
The results show that the role of the wrong
settings is, anyway, more important on the de-
pendent errors than on the single errors. It is
worth mentioning that, in the course of detailed
analyses and interviews of this study, many de-
pendent mechanisms, first regarded as wrong
settings, could be screened out. This was due to
the fact that they, actually, were found to be
caused by ageing and lack of preventive mainte-
nance, too. In the utility fault records, they were
originally classified as deficient settings. Should
their analysis be carried out on a superficial level,
the wrong settings would have dominated as the
causes of the dependent human errors.
Operational situations at fault detection. The
following Figure 14 presents the detection states
of the dependent human errors in the case that
they were born during the outage time.
No graphical presentation is given to those 3
dependent error mechanisms born during the
power operation, although they were HCCFs. Two
of these HCCFs were introduced in relation to
modifications installed during the power operat-
ing period. One of them was detected in a periodic
test and the two others by help of alarms as a part
of routine activities, during the power operation.
The detection modes of the dependent errors born
in outages are very interesting. With regard to the
single human errors, about 40 % remained unde-
tected until the power operation even after start-
up (Section 5.1, Figure 10). A larger part of de-
pendent errors seems to remain latent, since from
all dependent errors, as well as from the HCCFs,
about 60 % remained undetected at least until the
start-up, which appears somewhat surprising.
However, one has to bear in mind that the
Figure 13. Distribution of the cause categories among the HCCF and HCCN cases.
SET = Wrong setting, OM = Omission, COM / OTH = other qualitative commission error,
COM / WD = Wrong direction error.
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database is rather small, when dependencies are
studied. This limitation does not overrule the fact
that a large proportion of the dependencies has
remained undetected and even one of them has
been discovered through a reactor scram and
another by alarms bringing repeated stops to the
start-up of the unit.
Origin and detection of the dependent
human errors. A thorough treatment and analy-
sis of the dependent human errors allowed to
make further inference about their birth and dis-
covery mechanisms. Modifications seem to be an
important source of dependencies with the share
of about 50% (7 cases). The distribution among
other source activities is more even as can be seen
in the Figure 15.
The result is interesting from the safety point
of view, because it is difficult to know which kind
of hazards are due to new equipment requiring
new designs, system interactions, skills and prac-
tices. However, utilities carry out extensive start-
up tests on their new equipment. In future, even a
more comprehensive project coordination, design
and start-up testing of the backfittings and modi-
fications would, apparently, facilitate better re-
sults.
It has to be kept in mind that all the equipment
affected by these dependence mechanisms were
I&C or electrical related. Therefore, especially the
installation, maintenance and design of these
equipment and their interrelationships with other
items, including also instrument lines and me-
chanical parts, deserve more attention.
Another side of the above Figure 15 is the
detection situation of the dependencies, complet-
ing the Figure 14. Although periodic testing causes
sometimes dependencies, it reveals here more
than induces. Thus, the discussion on whether the
amount of testing should be decreased does not
receive support from this study without a further
effort. Otherwise, central alarms and shift walk-
arounds through local alarms have contributed to
detection of a significant share of the dependent
errors.
Apart from the detailed original error modes,
also the underlying contributing factors were
studied, as shown in the following Figure 16.
Weaknesses in work management and plan-
ning seem to contribute as underlying causes into
occurrence of dependent human errors in the half
of the cases. In the most cases these problems
occurred in relation to modifications, but also
Figure 14. Distribution of the fault detection states of the human related dependencies given that they
were introduced during an outage period (11 cases).
OUT/PREV = Detected by preventive action during outage, OUT = Otherwise detected during outage, STUP = Detected
by start-up, POW/PREV = Detected by preventive action during power operation, POW = Otherwise detected during
power operation, DIST =Detected through plant disturbance.
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through preventive maintenance actions during
an outage. These underlying causes are partially
interrelated with weaknesses in project co-ordina-
tion and poor designs from the maintainability
point of view. The underlying contributing causes
“insufficient knowledge” exhibit the usefulness of
the available knowledge of specialist technical
personnel at the suppliers or the utility in prob-
lem solving.
Significance of dependent human errors.
An important topic to study is the safety signifi-
cance of the dependent human errors. This evalu-
ation can be based on many criteria, such as PSA
importance measures and safety classification of
the equipment. From the dependencies studied
here, 9 of the 14 cases were related to safety
systems. 6 of these 9 dependence cases were
related to instrumentation. In addition, 6 of the 8
HCCF cases were in safety related systems. In the
light of these results, the risk significance of the
dependent human maintenance related errors
should not be underestimated.
A closer look at the distribution of dependen-
cies showed that in at least 3 cases both the plant
units were affected by them. Two cases were
HCCFs in safety related systems. Besides, in at
least 2 cases more than one system and in at least
10 cases more than 2 components were affected by
the dependence mechanisms (including the pre-
mentioned classes). This manifests the fact that,
in I&C systems, a dependence mechanism may
result in a wide spread of consequences.
Figure 15. The erroneous task (left) and detection activity types (right) of the dependent human errors.
Figure 16. Underlying causes of dependent human errors (14 cases).
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The number of the dependent human er-
rors. The annual average of the dependent hu-
man errors (sum of HCCFs and HCCNs) through
1992–1994 is app. 2,3 cases per year, as shown in
the following Figure 17. One almost similar HCCN
mechanism was reported during two different
calendar years, and it is, consequently, counted
twice.
It is interesting to compare the results ob-
tained here to those of [Reiman 1994]. That study
reported the annual average of approximately 2,4
dependent human errors from the 11 year long
observation period. The small difference may be
due to the fact that multiple human errors are
mostly reported also in other forms than fault
records, which shows a good safety culture of the
utility.
In the Figure 17 a slightly increasing trend
appears in the number of dependent human er-
rors (HCCFN = HCCF + HCCN). However, it is too
early to make such a conclusion in the light of the
small sample and the short observation period. It
should be noticed that the above Figure 17 also
presents the number of the identified human
related shared equipment faults (HSEF). The
HSEFs are discussed in the following section 5.3
of this report.
Weaknesses in the protective barriers. In
the following Figure 18, the occurrences of ineffec-
tive operative and organisational barriers against
human related dependencies (HCCFs and
HCCNs) are compiled. The operative barriers are
checks and tests performed by the personnel di-
rectly involved in these preventive tasks.
In the thorough analysis of the dependent
human errors it was searched for broken opera-
tive barriers in the HCCF and HCCN cases. For
the statistical compilation of the cases one broken
barrier per case was selected. As can be seen from
the Figure 18, and understood from the root cause
analyses, the highest potential for enforcement of
the operative barriers can be identified in the
start-up testing of modifications and in the instal-
lation checks of the maintenance actions in con-
nection to the outages times.
The organisational protective barriers against
dependent human errors are checks, reviews and
proactive actions performed by engineers, manag-
ers or safety and quality control personnel not
directly involved in the operative work in the
plant units. In this simplified barrier analysis, it
was looked for one or two broken organisational
barriers per each HCCF and HCCN case.
An enhancement of the coverage of the start-
up test programs, for better detection of failure
modes introduced in relation to modifications, has
a significant potential to reduce the consequences
of dependent human errors. In addition, an en-
hanced feedback of experiences from commission
errors in preventive maintenance actions into the
training of contractor personnel, could reduce the
occurrence of specific maintenance related multi-
ple human error cases in the future. Also some
specific weaknesses in the work management and
work order processes have facilitated errors to
pass through into dependent failures. The identi-
Figure 17. Annual distribution of HCCFs and HCCNs through 1992–1994. Totally 14 cases, since one
almost similar HCCN mechanism was distributed over two years of time.
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fied specific weaknesses in the organisational pro-
tective barriers against multiple human errors
exhibit also a potential opportunity to enhance the
project co-ordination and review from the design
up to and including the start-up testing of modifi-
cations.
5.3 Shared equipment faults and
other dependencies
Apart from the analysed single human errors and
dependent human errors, the studied data
contained several cases that could not easily be
classified into either class. As discussed earlier, a
number of ageing mechanisms, contributing to
wrong settings in instrumentation and electrical
equipment, were found. Also lacking preventive
maintenance and poor design were identified as
contributors to some ageing related dependent non
critical failures in mechanical equipment.
Moreover, two software errors and some other
human induced mechanisms, causing parallel
faults or initiating events, were discovered. Since
the detailed treatment of such dependent failures
does not belong into the scope of this study, they
are not discussed in the following.
Human related shared equipment faults.
In specific cases, single human errors affecting
shared equipment have caused multiple conse-
quences on different subsystems or parallel com-
ponents. Those single human errors that have
caused multiple component faults were classified
as human shared equipment faults (HSEFs). A
part of the HSEFs are also cascade failures, e.g
one single loose joint of a manometer has resulted
recurrently in nitrogen pressure drops in parallel
operating oil accumulators. Also cables belonging
to two different direct current subsystems within
one electronic cubicle, or four LPRM detector
cables collected into bundles, have been affected
by careless single actions during maintenance or
testing performed in limited work spaces. In order
to simplify the presentation of these additional
analysis results, the critical or non-critical shared
equipment faults were treated as one HSEF group
in the following statistics.
Together 12 HSEFs were identified, of which 3
cases were omissions and 7 cases other commis-
sions than wrong direction errors. All the omis-
sions were cases, where one single error, e.g.
forgotten restoration (mentioned in work permit)
or missed section in instructions, led to multiple
consequential omissions. Otherwise the distribu-
tion of error types and equipment involved
roughly follows the distribution of other single
human and dependent errors (HCCFs and
HCCNs), as shown in Figures 6 and 13. Again, it
should be noticed that the HSEF type errors
affecting instrumentation have not only occurred
in the work which is specific for the maintenance
group of I & C.
A graphical presentation of the annual number
of HSEFs was already shown in Figure 17. The
low number during 1994 may be due to incomplete
identification, as already discussed in relationship
to Figure 11 of this report.
Figure 18. Weaknesses in operational and organisational barriers identified in relation to dependent
human errors (14 cases of HCCFs and HCCNs).
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The Table X shows that eight HSEFs have
been identified during the power operating state.
However, as seen from Figure 19, only 3 cases (42
%) of those born during an outage have remained
latent until the power operation. All those HSEFs
caused during the power operation were also de-
tected in that operating state. As an analogy to
single errors, preventive actions have been rather
insignificant detection means with only a share of
17 %.
Apart from the aforementioned mechanisms,
many recurrent faults or problems and vague
situations allowing multiple interpretations were
found in the database. Based on the “Principles
followed in the classification of human error data”
in Table V, some of the human induced dependent
Table X. Annual number and distribution of human related shared equipment faults (HSEFs) into equip-
ment types, error types and fault detection states.
Year Number Equipment
type
Number Error type Number Detection
state
Number
1992 4 I & C 10 SET 1 POW/PREV 1
1993 7 EL 1 OM 3 POW 7
1994 1 VAL 1 COM/WD 1 OUT/PREV 1
COM/OTH 7 OUT 3
Total 12 12 12 12
failures could not be regarded as HCCFs, HCCNs
or HSEFs. In three cases, where the human origin
of the dependence was evident, the decision to
classify them into the class “other dependencies”
was made. Examples of such cases are: the wrong
direction in welding of reactor scram system
degasing valves (discovered before the work per-
mit was returned), forgetting to tighten the
handweels of two valves belonging to two different
cylinders of one boron pump (dependent errors
inside the component boundary) and wrong line-
up of a drainage valve after modification (two
rooms contaminated). In the cases, where the
dependence remained unclear even after the in-
terviews, single errors were assumed.
Figure 19. Distribution of the fault detection states of human induced shared equipment faults according
to the plant state at the birth of the error.
SHUT= refuelling outage period, OPER= power operation period
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The number of faults and errors. The fault
records read through covered about 4400 cases
from the years 1992–94. This number of the
records seems superficially to be very high, but is
as evaluated closer comparable with the amount
of similar reports from the other Nordic NPP units
(compare with TUD 94-11). However significant
differences in the number of the failure records
between different Nordic plant units are found
due to the different number of components per
unit, different strategies on preventive
maintenance and different criteria for the
coverage of the reporting of failures, degradations
and other findings in the “fault” records.
Uncertainties in cause coding and identi-
fication of errors. The most significant uncer-
tainties in the results of this work are related to
the data and its uses, i.e., identifying human
errors based on the fault records and classifying
them afterwards. The aim of the descriptive text
documented in a fault record is to report briefly
the fault discovery for consideration and prepara-
tion of a work order and to describe briefly the
corrective maintenance action performed. There-
fore it is often difficult to identify the human
errors as fault causes from the text of the failure
reports only, as discussed in the Section 4.2 of this
report.
The detailed cause coding in the work order
feedback information, when correctly defined, sup-
ported in many cases the identification of the
human errors from the years 1992–93. The de-
tailed scheme was abandoned in 1994, based on
the changes done in the reporting requirements
for new Nordic Nuclear Power Reliability Data
System [TUD 1994]. The simplification in the
cause classification left only the rougher cause
categories A, B, C and D in use, but the fault type
“human error” was added into the related classifi-
cation list of fault types. But the human errors
contribute to technical faults which are mostly
suitable to be selected from the classification
scheme of the fault types. In Figure 20, the origin
of identified 206 single human error cases from
the four different cause categories is shown for the
calendar years 1992–1993 and 1994 respectively.
As seen in Figure 20, the number of single
human errors decreased in 1994. Especially, this
meant that the cause category B, “Operating and/
or maintenance personnel”, was identified less
than in 1992–1993 as a fault cause. This may be
explained by the fact that the use of the rough
classification only may confuse the personnel,
since the rough cause categories without an ex-
planatory breakdown are heavily overlapping, at
the first sight. Another generic factor will also
decrease the credibility of the classification in
overall: The personnel who perform the classifica-
tion based on the feedback of the fault (after the
repair), seem not to have any feedback from the
utilisation of their cause classification. This was
taken into account by screening all the faults
instead of the pre-classified “Operating or mainte-
nance personnel” related faults only, which con-
tributed to an identification of a larger number of
single human errors than expected in 1992–1993.
However, it should be noticed that the quality and
contents of the used plant maintenance records is
very good when compared with the experiences
achieved during international studies such as
[NEA/CSNI 1995].
Another observation was that the decrease in
COM/OTH type errors (other commission errors
than the wrong direction errors) explains almost
solely the decrease of the identified single human
errors in 1994 (see also Figure 11 and the text in
relation to that). On the other hand, the number
of reported dependent human errors has remained
6 DISCUSSION ON DATA
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rather stable through 1992–1994. A further analy-
sis of this phenomenon is left outside this report,
since no single factors can be found contributing
significantly to the effect.
The cause categories in the fault records do not
address the contemporary (simultaneous) faults
in redundant or similar components. This may
partially contribute to the fact that some depend-
ent mechanisms remain unnoticed at the plant
unit and in our follow-up analyses of fault records.
Such dependent error mechanisms are difficult to
identify, if they were not identified in relation to
the periodic tests of safety systems as susceptible
CCFs or analysed otherwise in relation to signifi-
cant operational or damage events. Besides, at the
outset of the study the target was set to identify
dependent human errors causing faults in redun-
dant components or subsystems. This led to the
result where otherwise correlated dependence
mechanisms where left outside an accurate con-
sideration and may in some cases appear as single
errors. Finally, it has to be said that in some cases
the amount of correlation between some human
errors was rather difficult to define and, conse-
quently, they were classified as single ones.
Figure 20. The origin of the identified single human errors from the plant classified cause categories.
A=Failure in installation or earlier, B= Operating or maintenance personnel, C= Consequence of operation,
D= Miscellaneous causes, - = Not included.
Distribution of cause coding categories in 1992-1993 and in
1994 (206 cases)
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The human error type classification used in
our study was not very detailed. More detailed
taxonomies, presented in e.g. [Reason 1990],
would have required still more work and the
classification results, might still have been rather
uncertain for the single errors.
Other data sources. The authors wish to
express that there are also other data sources that
may be used to complete the results, e.g., quar-
terly reports, annual outage event reports, scram
reports, test and calibration protocols, control
room log books, detailed work orders and modifi-
cation data. This information was utilised to a
limited extent or not at all in the study. The
reason for this was to limit the effort. For exam-
ple, finding evidence from the calibration protocols
requires a great deal of resources of an experi-
enced researcher.
Detailed statistical significance testing was left
outside this report. This is supported by the fact
that in most cases the influences were clear and
could be inferred otherwise. In future, some sta-
tistical tests may be carried out in order to study
the information further as a basis for the PSA
data.
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Conclusions. The study was capable to produce
useful results as pinpointing areas for justified
consideration of remedial measures. Also
interesting results for the organisational learning,
experience feedback and training were achieved.
The single and dependent human errors
showed rather similar behaviour with regard to
the explanatory factors on instrumentation and
electrical equipment. Instrumentation, automa-
tion and electrical equipment seem to be prone to
human errors, partly due to their vulnerability
and partly to the complexity of their influences.
Human errors and human common cause failures
related with instrumentation dominated the re-
sults. This supports the view that more emphasis
should be given to the safety and work manage-
ment of complex instrumentation and protection
systems and equipment. It should also be noticed
that the mechanical equipment was affected by
single maintenance related errors only, but sig-
nificantly by qualitative human errors including
use of too much or too little force.
When considering remedial actions, it has to be
taken into account that also personnel from other
trades than instrumentation have contributed to
these instrumentation related errors. Many of the
results were expected, e.g. that the most mainte-
nance related errors stem from the refuelling
outage period. But it was surprising that many of
the faults remain undetected until the power
operation. In the common cause failures, the plant
modifications are an important source class. That
is the main reason, why enhanced project co-
ordination, post-installation check-ups and start-
up testing programs are suggested to further
decrease the amount of dependent errors.
Partially this objective, and an enhanced infor-
mation transfer between the different organisa-
tional branches, could be achieved by e.g. intro-
duction of formal turn-over and acceptance proce-
dures, consisting of checks and reviews, between
the project phases of the modifications in a rather
similar way as applied for the technical systems
during the erection and start-up phase of the
plant. An enhanced responsibility and involve-
ment of the operation and maintenance personnel
in the decisions and reviews during the early
phases of the modification projects could also
support better the erection, operability and main-
tenance targets of the modification.
In addition, the ongoing equipment responsi-
bility related developments of the utility have a
potential to enhance the commitment of the main-
tenance personnel and thus reduce further the
human errors in relation to maintenance. The
safety related training of maintenance personnel
is however more heterogeneous than the one the
operating crews receive, and the need of better
training has often been discussed.
In a limited number of specific cases, single
human errors have caused multiple consequences
on different subsystems or parallel components.
Those so called human shared equipment faults
are of interest both from the safety and potential
design improvement point of view. E.g. multiple
components in limited work spaces, and technical
dependencies of parallel equipment of shared com-
ponents, have contributed to multiple failure con-
sequences of single maintenance or testing errors.
The safety significance of the human er-
rors in relation to maintenance. A significant
number of human errors and common cause fail-
ures took place in safety related systems, but not
all of them were functionally critical. E.g. 6 of 8
cases of the human related common cause fail-
ures, and 3 of the 6 human related common cause
non-critical failures, were in the safety systems. It
should be noticed that 6 of the 9 dependent error
7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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cases were in the safety related systems. In 10 of
the 14 dependent error cases more than 2 compo-
nents were affected. In at least two human com-
mon cause failure cases in safety systems two
plant units were affected.
Although no risk increase factors by using PSA
models [NKA/RAS-450 1990] were calculated, it
can be concluded that human errors in relation to
maintenance and modifications apparently may
have a significant safety influence. But much
more safety degradation would be caused if no
maintenance took place, which is shown by e.g.
the ageing related common cause failures due to
lack of preventive maintenance identified during
this study. Modifications were shown to be com-
plex and error prone and thus enhancement of the
principles of their decision making and their re-
view should apparently be considered .
Experiences from the study. The study was
rather unique since a large amount of plant spe-
cific maintenance data, and practical knowledge
from the maintenance and operation personnel,
was used as source information for systematic
search and analysis of human errors and common
cause failures.
The maintenance history database of the util-
ity was very useful. The constructed EXCEL based
database on follow-up analyses of the utility’s
maintenance history records was very flexible and
allowed many kinds of information retrievals and
sorting.
A number of ageing mechanisms, contributing
to parallel wrong settings in instrumentation and
electrical equipment, were found in this work.
Also lacking preventive maintenance, often in
interaction with poor design assumptions, were
identified as contributors to specific ageing re-
lated dependent non-critical failures in mechani-
cal equipment. Although left outside the scope of
this report, these degradation mechanisms should
preferably be studied in detail in other ageing and
maintenance related R& D projects.
Identification, description and classification of
fault causes is a controversial topic possibly due to
limited possibilities of the maintenance foremen
to thoroughly investigate the faults locally in the
plant and analyse the root causes. In addition, the
multiple failures should preferably be introduced
in the classification list of the fault records. The
ongoing equipment responsibility and mainte-
nance analysis developments of the utility have
the potential to increase the motivation of the
maintenance and operation personnel for en-
hanced experience data recording and fault inves-
tigation. However, the use of advanced classifica-
tion taxonomies cannot be the responsibility of the
maintenance foremen, but these tasks belong to
the systematic maintenance follow-up analyses
more suitable to be started by other personnel
responsible for maintenance, availability and
safety assessments and developments.
The amount of the development, screening,
analysis and reporting work in this study was
more extensive than expected. Based on these
developments and experiences a less resource
demanding and simplified screening and analysis
model could be defined for routine use.
Thorough analyses of the origin and depend-
ence of the errors, and identification of the weak-
nesses in the operative and organisational protec-
tive barriers against them, were done for the
dependent human errors for learning and statisti-
cal treatment purposes.
The available data analysis bases allow addi-
tional analyses of human reliability data, shared
equipment faults and ageing caused dependent
failures for PSAs and quality developments of
maintenance activities and modification projects.
The constructive co-operation of the maintenance
and operability personnel of the utility has shown
that a wider utilisation of this kind of accumu-
lated maintenance experience and knowledge base
can be recommended in the future.
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APPENDIX 1
The following graphs illustrate the birth of dependencies both through omissions (OM) of actions and
erroneous actions (COM/WD, SET, COM/OTH). Note that a task may be carried out correctly according
to the plans, but the plans or the design in itself may be deficient or wrong. Similarly, a single human
error may cause multiple effects dur to system and component interdependencies.
A work task is: Task is carried out: Consequences:
carried out correctly n times OK, if correctly planned
k out n dependent errors
correctly n-m times if k=1, dependences still possible due to
intercomponent dependences (HSEFs)
all n incorrectly dependent fault of nth grade
(HCCF or HCCN)
No modification, maintenance etc.
not carried out Ageing mechanisms
NPPs have many inspection procedures and tests defined in TechSpecs and other check-ups to detect
component faults and malfunctions. They are nominated as barriers, in the following graph. The idea of
these barriers is to timely detect hazardous faults and human errors. To be able to cause safety effects,
an error has to penetrate several barriers without detection. In some cases, even a duly performed test
cannot discover all the error or fault mechanisms.
A barrier* is established Barrier task is carried out: Consequences:
Yes correctly n times OK, if correctly planned
some errors may still penetrate
correctly n-m times Single and lower grade dependent
errors may penetrate
all n incorrectly All single and dependent errors
can be assumed to penetrate
All single and dependent errors
No can be assumed to penetrate
* barriers are either operational (tests etc.) or organisational (reviews etc.)
The unavailability i.e. probability of a component being inoperable, caused by an error penetrating
several barriers, is obtained from formula (1):
Urest = +
Ø
º
Œ
Œ
ø
ß
œ
œ= =
q p ( T  T p  ) T0 0 i 
i 1
n
j 1
i
j total (1)
where q=probability of an error (causing unavailability), p0,1,2,..= probabilities for passing barrier point j,
Ti=time after barrier point i and Ttotal is the total—yearly or test—time period.
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APPENDIX 2 HCCF ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS FORM
Title: POWER CABLES CUT TO THE SUPPLY PUMPS
OF THE  DIESEL FUEL TANKS
I. INFORMATION IN THE FAILURE REPORT/WORK ORDER OF THE PLANT
(Identification of the plant, equipment, fault, date and repair time):
TVO  I  II Equipment place identification  number:  656 T003 Work number: 45738, (45739, 45740)
Year: 1992    Date (fault detected): 26.08.92  Time: 11.15     Date (repair started): 26.08.92  Time: 13.00
Date (work finished): 26.08.92 Time: 17.36
The written text in the failure report of the plant (description of fault and corrective actions):
1. 656 K433 L2 T3 low level alarm. T3 will not be filled
2. The power cabling to the outdoor pump cut at the erection work place of  start-up transformers.
3. Failure reports 1245739 and 1245740 done.
The cause classification in the failure report (1-2 types):      A  B(F)  C   D   W 
The information under this line was prepared by follow-up analysis of the reporting.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. IDENTIFICATION OF  THE ERROR TYPE
Type of direct human error (1-2 types) : omission (incl. restoration errors)   mistake among alter-
natives  wrong setting    other erroneous action (incl. installation errors)    dependent failure
(deeper analysis)  
Type of root cause to human error if identified:  design deficiency   poor work planning or man-
agement      deficient information transfer or co-operation   rule based error  
knowledge based error  
Type of equipment involved: Process valves, ventilation dampers or channel hatchces   block or
primary valves in instrument lines   other mechanical equipment    instrumentation, control or
software   electrical  equipment 
The human error  was introduced within:  refuelling outage period     power operation  period 
not clear    (if cannot be directed to the periods as above).
S T U K - Y T O - T R 1 3 9
39
HCCF ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS FORM APPENDIX 2
The  error  was detected in (1-2 types):  independent check or test  otherwise  
 plant shutdown period prior to start-up  plant start-up  power operation  
plant shut-down  plant disturbance     otherwise  
Candidates for dependent failures (based on time relation or functional connections of  “sin-
gle failures”) are:
1. 656 P031 / failure report 45739 / 26.08.92 and 656 P011 / failure report 45740 /26.08.92
2. The power supply cables cut to the fuel supply pumps 656 P031 and 656 P011 of the two day fuel
tanks of the emergency  diesel generators (report).
Terminate the analysis of single failures over this line. Continue the analysis under this line
for the candidate dependent failures only.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. INFORMATION ON THE  TASK BY WHICH THE FAULT WAS DETECTED
Detection method  unclear  Fault possibly detected in    certainly detected in   the task:
1. Periodic loading and running test of the diesel generator.
The detection method was : alarm   operation supervision in control rooms, how ___________________
 functional testing  after maintenance  periodic testing (e.g acc. to technical specifications)    scheduled
preventive maintenance  repair    shift walk-around or alignment)    equipment worked not on
demand     other authority inspection (e.g.  NDT)    other check  or  test   ,
 which___________________________    Date:26.08.94 Interval: 4  weeks
Operational state and situation at detection (1-2 types): cold shutdown of reactor   refuelling    hot
shutdown of reactor    nuclear heating    hot standby of reactor   power operation  start-up  
shutting down   plant disturbance     other      which __________________________
Complementary information (e.g. identification number of techspec test or preventive
maintenance action):
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IV. INFORMATION ON THE WORK TASK WHERE THE ERROR OCCURRED
Cause of the fault unclear    Fault possibly caused in   Fault certainly caused in  the action:
1. Cable charts outside the wall of the plant not kept up to date during the construction period of the
plant.
2. Own maintenance worker cut as ordered the “extra” 380 V cables at the erection work place of the
additional  start-up transformers (612).
3. The cut was done in order to facilitate the erection of the additional 110 kV cabling.
The action was (1–2 types): preventive maintenance   repair modification  periodic test 
interval________weeks functional test   other    date (possible or certain): 19.08. 1992
Complementary description:
1. The power cables were encapsulated but not documented and the cables thus thought to be “out of
use” cables needed during the earlier plant construction period only.
2. The “unexpectedly” found cables had no voltage due to standstill of the related fuel supply.
The causing action occurred during (1–2  types) : old shutdown of reactor   refruelling    hot shut-
down of reactor  nuclear heating      hot standby of reactor   power operation   starting
up    shutting down 
Complementary information (e.g. description of how the fault occurrence could have been
avoided):
V.  THE ORIGIN  AND DEPENDENCE OF THE FAULT
Type of human error (1-2 types):omission (also restoration errors)  mistake among alternatives 
wrong setting   other  erroneous action (carelessness errors etc.)  dependent failure 
The originating mechanism of the error and dependence is  (1-2 types) : (design deficiency e.g.
documentation not updated    ) (rule based error, e.g. deficient procedure) or order or rules not followed
  , insufficient knowledge, e.g. due to lacking training   , poor work planning or management, e.g. in
definition of work scope or supervision  of subcontractors      poor information transfer  (e.g.  due to
organizational changes or poor experience feedback)  , poor tools (selection, maintenance or QC) 
other   , ______________________________(or complementary information on which organizational unit
or personnel category):
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The error was additionally caused by:  equipment close to each other (e.g. same room)   , adminis-
trative easiness (e.g. sequential tasks feasible soon after each other)   same group (e.g. similar tasks on
similar components   deficient preventive maintenance (e.g. the effects of ageing not avoided by prompt
inspection or replacement of degrading components)   heavy work load or tight time schedule  
equipment not uniquely identified (e.g. due to poor identification or name plate) 
Explanatory description:
1. Cable charts outside the plant walls were not kept up to date.
2. In addition, unnecessary cables from the plant construction period were known to lie under the
earth level.
Consequences of the error (e.g. unavailability time of equipment or system):
Consequence classification in failure report: A   B   C   D    E    F    G    H    I 
Delay time (from originating work task until fault detection):   about 168  hours.
Total unavailability time: about 174 hours.
Complementary information (e.g description of consequences):
VI. NOTES ON POSSIBLE INEFFECTIVENESS OF DEFENSIVE BARRIERS
Error  not detected in the operative check (check following after the work action, 1-2 types):
preventive maintenance adjusting   functional test   alignment   start-up test   periodic test
   interval ____________ (other check   poor installation check-up which was ineffective
_____ date__________  plant state, which ___________
Complementary information (e.g. identification number of TechSpec test or preventive main-
tenance task or explanation, if checking task existed):
Error was not detected in organizational check (independent QA and QC, performed prior,
during or after the work task):   Deficient review of: design    work planning   start-up testing
program   deficient acceptance inspection      other review or inspection , which___________
_______________________________
Complementary information (e.g. which possible other  review or check actions could have
detected the error):
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VII. PROPOSAL OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDIAL MEASURES
The problem can be corrected (or already corrected and the success possibly evaluated) by:
1. Cable charts concerning areas outside the plant walls were prepared to an up to date status.
2. Procedures were prepared for identification of cables found during digging work and for cutting
off power cables. The procedures are  in use (e.g. cable radar, cutting needs work order.)
3. An increase of the fuel margins in the day tanks for the diesels was implemented by making the
tank level L2 higher.
